Preservation and interpolation results are obtained for L1! and sublogics L L1! such that equivalence in L can be characterized by suitable back-and-forth conditions on sets of partial isomorphisms.
Introduction
In the heyday of in nitary logic in the 1960's and 70's, most attention was focused on L !1! and its fragments (see e.g. Keisler 19] ), since countable formulas seemed best behaved. The past decade has seen a renewed interest in L 1! and its nite variable fragments L with each of these inclusions being proper. Moreover, there is a useful and elegant algebraic characterization of equivalence in L in each of these logics L, from bisimilarity at the left end to potential isomorphism at the right. These algebraic relations on structures are often de ned by what is called a \peb-ble game," a game between two players, one of whom wants to show that the structures are not equivalent, the other who wants to show they are.
Most of the recent work involving the nite variable fragments L (k) 1! has focused on nite structures. As a result, there are many open questions regarding these logics when one drops the restriction to nite structures { questions that should really have been settled in the 70's, but were overlooked, probably due to the preoccupation with L !1! . We address a certain class of these questions in this paper, namely, questions involving interpolation and preservation. The following is a sample result: if a sentence ' of L 1! is preserved under bisimulation then it is logically equivalent to a sentence of the modal fragment L 1! . We obtain this as a corollary to an interpolation theorem relating L 1! and L 1! .
A glance through this paper will show that we have obtained a number of results of this same general character: an interpolation theorem with a preservation theorem as consequence. The proofs all use a single method. We introduce this method by proving an interpolation theorem for L 1! in this section. In section 2 we extract a general method by analyzing this proof of interpolation in terms of \co-inductive pebble games." This analysis results in a certain \ab-stract interpolation theorem" which is then applied to yield other results in section 3. Section 4 discusses some open questions.
Notation
We assume the reader is familiar with rst-order model theory. Our notation is fairly standard. By a vocabulary we mean a set L of relation and constant 1! . Given an L-structure A, a formula ', and a function s assigning elements of A to the free variables in ', we write A;s j = ' and A j = ' s] interchangeably to indicate that s satis es the formula ' in the structure A. We write A for the universe of A and R A for the interpretation of the symbol R in A.
Given a vocabulary L, the language L 1! is the usual language over L that allows nite strings of quanti ers, negations, and arbitrary conjunctions and disjunctions. L !! is the fragment of L 1! allowing only nite conjunctions and disjunctions. L !1! is the fragment that allows only countable conjunctions and disjunctions. Given a natural number k, 2 k < !, the k-variable fragment L (k) 1! of L 1! consists of those formulas of L 1! which have been constructed using at most k constants and variables, free or bound.
We prove results for L 1! and its fragments. Some of these results require that we be able to perform all the usual operations from rst-order logic. We call such fragments regular. These include L !! ; L !1! , admissible fragments, fragments of the form L ! , and so forth. The nite variable fragments are not regular. By an in nitary fragment we mean one that is closed under at least recursive conjunctions and disjunctions of nitary formulas.
Given a fragment L of L 1! , we write 1 1 (L) to indicate a second-order sentence obtained from a sentence of L by means of second-order existential quanti cation, or, if we are talking about a class C of structures, to indicate that C is de nable by such a sentence. We write 1 1 for 1 1 (L !! ). We de ne 1 1 (L) and 1 1 dually.
Given a vocabulary L and L-structures A and B we write (A; B) for the structure that incorporates both structures in some standard way. Thus, for example, one could consider it as an L structure, where L contains L, a disjoint copy L 0 of L, and two unary predicates U; V such that A is the interpretation of U in (A; B) and similarly for B and V .
We write f : A = B to mean that f is an isomorphism of the L-structures, and A = B if f : A = B for some f. By a partial isomorphism from A to B
we mean a partial function with domain contained in A and range contained in B that preserves structure: if a 1 ; : : : ; a n 2 dom(f) then for each n-ary predicate P of L, ha 1 : : : a n i 2 P A i hf(a 1 ) : : : f(a n )i 2 P B and if a 2 dom(f) then for each constant symbol c of L, a = c A i f(a) = c B .
Not every interpretation of a constant of L need be in the domain of f.
The following de nition allows us to express our results in a succinct form.
De nition 1 If R is a binary relation on L-structures then ' entails along R, written ' j = R , i for all L-structures A;B, if A R B and A j = ' then B j = . In particular, ' is preserved under R if ' j = R '.
For example, all sentences are preserved under isomorphism, and entailment along isomorphism just amounts to the usual notion of logical entailment. Existential sentences are preserved under embeddings. Positive sentences are preserved under homomorphic images.
Interpolation for L 1!
There are several equivalent ways to formulate the interpolation property for a logic L. The one we nd convenient is this. We say that L has the standard interpolation property if for all ' 2 1 1 (L) and 2 1 1 (L) in a common vocabulary L, if ' entails , then there is a sentence 2 L in the same vocabulary L such that ' j = and j = . Such a will be called an interpolant between '
and .
First-order logic L !! and the in nitary logic L !1! have the standard interpolation property (due to Craig and to Lopez-Escobar 20], respectively), as do admissible fragments of L !1! ( Barwise 5] ). Not many other logics have the standard interpolation property, however. In particular, L 1! fails to have the standard interpolation property, a result due to Malitz 22] .
The standard counterexample
It is instructive to recall one of the familiar counterexamples to interpolation for L 1! . Let (<) be the sentence using < and = that says that the universe A of the structure A is wellordered by < A in order type ! 1 . Similarly, let (<) say that A is wellordered by < A in of order type !. Clearly (9<)'(<) entails (8<): (<) since no set that can be wellordered in order type ! 1 can be wellordered in order type !.
Suppose that is an L 1! interpolant for these two sentences, that is, a sentence implied by (9<)'(<) and implying (8<): (<), and involving only the symbol =. Since any set of size @ 1 is a model of ', is true in all models of size @ 1 . Similarly, is true in no set of size @ 0 . However, all in nite structures are known to be indistinguishable in L 1! , if we use only =. So this is impossible.
Let's go over this last step a bit more carefully, since the reason it works is crucial to an understanding of the results of this paper. Karp Barwise 3] ). In particular, in connection with the above counterexample to interpolation, if A and B be any two in nite sets (structures for the vocabulary that has only = as a symbol), and I is the set of all nite one-one functions with domain a subset of A and range a subset of B, then I : A =p B. Thus, the last step in the proof of the counterexample to interpolation is an immediate consequence of the left to right half of the following famous result:
Theorem 1 (Karp's Theorem) A =p B i A and B are L 1! -equivalent.
The proof, originally given in Karp 18] , can also be found in Chang 15 Moreover, the collection of all such sentences is a proper set.
This result was implicit in Scott's proof that every countable structure can be characterized up to isomorphism by a sentence of L !1! in Scott 26] . As formulated here it can be found in Barwise 3] . In applying the general framework developed below, the main work will be in establishing analogues of Scott's result. This will usually be accomplished by fairly minor variations on Scott's proof, so we review it brie y here.
Scott's proof shows how to axiomatize the class of those B for which there is an -tower relating A to B. For every < 1 and a 1 : : : a 2 The formulas (a1:::an) are de ned so as to insure that this gives us an tower.
Notice that the empty function is in I by the assumption that B j = () .
We now turn to the proof of our rst Interpolation Theorem.
Proof of the Interpolation Theorem: The proof that (2) implies (1) is immediate, given (the easy half of) Karp's Theorem, as we have already indicated. We show that (1) implies (2) by showing that (1) implies (3) and (3) implies (2), where:
3. There is an ordinal such that ' entails along 1! .
If '; 2 L 1! , then (3) Code all this up in a sentence (<; : : :), but one that is independent of . The relation symbols here will include those quanti ed in ' and . Since (<; : : :) has models where < is arbitrarily long, it has to have a model that is not wellordered. Any descending sequence in this ordering gives rise to a set of partial isomorphisms with the back and forth property, so we get a contradiction to (1) . (This part of our proof is admittedly a bit sketchy but we will go into it in depth in our detailed analysis.) The proof of (3) implies (2) is more straightforward. Let be the bound in (3) . Let be the disjunction of the set of all sentences of the form A , the sentence that characterizes A up to 1! , for all models A such that A j = ', from Scott's Theorem. There is at most a set of such sentences, so is a sentence. To see that ' j = , let A be any model of '. Then A j = A , and this is one of the disjunctions of , so A j = . By (3), j = . 1. There is a formula (x) 2 L 1! such that ' j = 8x (P (x) $ (x)). Proof: The proof of (1) implies (2) is straightforward, given Karp's Theorem.
For the converse, assume (2) . Consider the sentences ' 0 (c) given by
9P '(P)^P(c)]
and given by 8P '(P) ! P(c)]:
We claim that by (2) We have given this proof in some detail because we will be interested in analogues of it in other settings. Note how our theorem relates explicit de n- 2 An analysis of the proof In this section we give an analysis of the above interpolation theorem and its proof. This will allow us to give a number of additional results with little further ado.
Some clues
We begin by making some disjointed remarks which, taken together, provide a set of clues for understanding what is at the heart of Theorem 2. By building on these ideas we will develop a general framework. This discussion will use some notions reviewed later in the paper. Clue 2 Given any pair A;B of L-structures there is always a largest set I of partial isomorphisms having the back-and-forth property, simply because the union of any family of such sets is another such set. Of course it could be that this largest family I is empty. Indeed, we see that A =p B i this largest I is non-empty. This largest set is the greatest xed point of the monotone operator ? de ned by ?(I) = ff j the back and forth condition holds for f and Ig:
The -th approximation I to this greatest xed point is the largest -tower of sets of partial isomorphisms that came up in the proof. Moreover, Scott's Theorem tells us, roughly, that the equivalence class associated with I is uniformly de nable in L 1! .
Clue 3 From recursion theory we recall that there is, over the natural numbers, an equivalence between 1 1 de nable predicates and greatest xed points of rst-order positive monotone operators. With a little bit of ddling, the correspondence between 1 1 -de nability and greatest xed points of rst-order elementary monotone operators extends from the natural numbers to arbitrary countable structures. On uncountable structures, the greatest xed points are always 1 Taken together, these clues suggests that the heart of Theorem 2 resides in the fact that =p is the coinductive counterpart of the 1 1 relation =. This suggestion is strengthened by the observation that the proof of (1) ) (3) of Theorem 2 makes essential use of the stages of the coinductive de nition of =p. If this hypothesis is correct, we ought to be able to generalize this result from = to other 1 1 relations R on L-structures, and we will do so.
Where do pebble games come into all this? They arise from a well known correspondence between games and inductive de nitions. Every monotone operator has associated with it open and closed games de ning its least and greatest xed points, respectively. The usual pebble game for =p is simply the closed game associated with the coinductive de nition of =p; see Proposition 10.
To make the interest of our results convincing, we need to be sure there really is something fundamental about the relationship between a 1 1 relation R and its coinductive counterpart, which we will write R abs . It is to this end that we devote the following digression.
Absolute versions of predicates
Since this section is more for motivation than for any results we will be using, we do not need a precise de nition of absoluteness in this paper; an intuitive one will do the job. 1 The intuitive idea is that an n-ary predicate P is absolute if whether or not P(a 1 : : : a n ) holds is independent of the universe of set theory in which a 1 : : : a n reside. In particular, if one were to \enlarge" the universe, so as to make some or all of a 1 : : : a n countable, then P(a 1 : : : a n ) would hold in the new universe i it held in the original universe. (One way to make this precise is to require that P be provably 1 in the vocabulary of set theory.)
Gerald Sacks 24] observed that \ . . . the central notions of model theory are absolute, and absoluteness, unlike cardinality, is a logical concept." Because cardinality is not absolute, the relation A = B of being isomorphic structures is not absolute. For example, two in nite sets of di erent cardinality are not isomorphic, but if they both became countable, by enlarging the universe of sets to include countings of them, then they would be isomorphic. By contrast, the relation A =p B of being potentially isomorphic is absolute. Not only that, the two relations agree as long as A and B are countable. This is a special case of a very general phenomenon.
Suppose we have two relations P and P abs on sets. We say that P abs is the absolute version of P provided that P is a subrelation of P abs , P and P abs agree on hereditary countable sets and that P abs is absolute. 2 Thus, as we have just noted, the relation A =p B is the absolute version of A = B.
The relation \A is embeddable in B," is not absolute but it is 1 1 so does have a natural absolute version. Similarly for \B is a homomorphic image of A."
Once one knows to look for them, it is not hard to nd the absolute versions of these relations. We will obtain preservation and interpolation theorems for these absolute relations and in so doing obtain analogues of the Los-Tarski Theorem and the Lyndon Theorem for L 1! .
We say that L has the L owenheim property if every sentence in 1 1 (L) that has a model has a nite or countable model. Proposition 6 Let R be some 1 1 relation on L-structures, R abs its absolute version. Let L be a regular logic having the L owenheim property, and let ' 2 1 1 (L) and 2 1 1 (L). Then the following are equivalent:
1. ' entails along R. 2. ' entails along R abs .
Proof: Since R R abs , the proof of (2) implies (1) In a similar way, one can prove the following: Proposition 7 Let F L 1! be such that the predicate\' 2 F" is absolute.
If the sentences in F are preserved along the 1 1 relation R, they must also be preserved along its absolute version R abs .
Proof: Assume that:
For all ' These results demonstrate that the natural place to look for preservation theorems is along absolute relations among structures. Moreover, any 1 1 relation R on structures has an associated absolute version, given as the largest xed point of an inductive de nition. Our strategy for generalizing Theorem 2, then, is as follows.
Strategy: Given some interesting 1 1 binary relation R on structures:
1. Find its absolute version R abs . 2. Find a set of L 1! sentences F that are preserved under R for obvious syntactic reasons. They will also be preserved under R abs .
3. Show that if 9S 1 '(S 1 ) entails 8S 2 (S 2 ) along R abs then there is a sentence 2 F such that 9S 1 '(S 1 ) j = and j = 8S 2 (S 2 ). (The converse follows from (2).) 4. Note that as a consequence we get the following preservation result: a sentence of L 1! is preserved under R abs i it is equivalent to a sentence in F.
In Theorem 2, R was the relation of isomorphism and F is the class of all sentences of L 1! . In this case, step (4) degenerates into triviality, but in other examples it won't. For example, when we start with R being the embeddability relation we obtain a semantic characterization of the set of existential sentences of L 1! . (Some of our applications start with a relation R that is given outright as a coinductive relation on structures. In these cases the rst step is trivial, since R is its own absolute version.)
Step (3) is the main one, and typically involves two parts, one corresponding to each of the two main steps in our proof of Theorem 2. The main tool for both steps is to realize that the relation R abs can be expressed as the greatest xed point of a rst-order positive operator ?, and so can be approximated from above by means of relations R : R 0 R 1 : : : R : : : R abs :
Let us review this basic construction. Proof: We need only prove that ?(I) I. Let a 2 ?(I). Since I I n+1 and ? is monotone, a 2 ?(I n+1 ), for each n. But ?(I n+1 ) I n , by assumption, so a 2 I n , for each n, hence a 2 I, as desired. (1) is immediate. The proof of (1) implies (2) is a generalization of the proof that (1) implies (3) in the proof of Theorem 2. Our proof there was rather sketchy since we give a detailed proof here. Again, we proceed by contradiction. Thus we suppose that (1) holds but that (2) fails. Then for every < wo(L) there is a structure A 2 C such that A ? 6 = A. By cardinality considerations, the cardinality of A must be at least as large as the cardinality of . Hence there is a subset A 0 A and a wellordering < of A 0 of order type + 1. For each a 2 A 0 let (a) be the order type of the predecessors of a; this is an ordinal . Now de ne a relation R on A by R = fha; bi j a 2 A 0 ; b 2 A ? (a) g: Let A be the structure (A; A 0 ; <; R), a structure for a vocabulary L extending L. The structure A satis es the following conditions:
1. < is a linear ordering of A 0 with a last element.
2. For every x 2 A 0 and every y, R(x; y) i '(y; fz j 9x 0 < xR(x 0 ; z)g) (where the set expression is substituted for the unary U in the de nition '(x; U) of ?).
3. 9y8x 2 A 0 :R(x; y). Recalling that C is 1 1 (L) de nable, let C be de ned by, say, 9S' 0 (S). Note that each of the above is expressible by a sentence of L and that none of these sentences depends on A or on . Let 0 (<) be the conjunction of these sentences, as well as the sentence ' 0 (S), and let (<) be the result of existentially quantifying all the symbols except <. Then for each < wo(L), (<) has models A where < A is a wellordering of order type + 1. Hence (<) has a model that is not a wellordering. But then there are A;A 0 ; R such that (A; A 0 ; <; R) makes all the above true. Let a 0 ; : : : ; a n+1 ; : : : 2 A 0 be such that : : : a n+1 < a n < : : : a 1 < a 0 :
De ne I n = fb j R(a n ; b)g. We claim that ?(I n+1 ) I n , for each n. To see this, note that ?(I n+1 ) = ?(fb j R(a n+1 ; b)g) = fc j A j = '(c; fb j R(a n+1 ; bg)g fc j A j = '(c; fb j 9x < a n R(x; b)g)g = fc j R(a n ; c)g
By the lemma, we have A ? 1 I n for each n, but I 0 is a proper subset of A, To apply this result in a wide class of cases, we want a framework where we can see the various pebble games as given by coinductive operators. If at a given stage of play, one of the players is unable to play, the other player wins. If the play goes on forever, then player II is the winner.
Pebble games
The following is a (special case of a) well-known observation. We include it only to explain why we are justi ed in thinking of any monotone operator on X Y as a pebble game.
Proposition 10 A position r is in ? 1 i II has a winning strategy whenever I plays r.
Proof: If r 2 ? 1 then let II always play ? 1 for a winning strategy. For the converse, let J be the set of all plays r from which II has some winning strategy. Clearly J ?(J) and so J ? 1 (1) and (3) 2. There is a disjunction of a set of sentences in F such ' j = and j = . In particular, a sentence ' of L is preserved under ? i it is equivalent to a disjunction of sentences from F.
Proof: The proof that (2) entails (1) is straightforward. The converse is just like the proof of Theorem 2 given Theorem 11. 
Applications
The method developed in the preceding section yields many interpolation and preservation results. The main step involves nding a pebble game that has the Scott Property relative to some natural class F. We begin with an example where the application of our method is quite straightforward.
A Los-Tarski Theorem
Our rst example is where we start with the relation \A is embeddable in B." This is a 1 1 relation on structures. The existential formulas, those constructed from literals using set conjunctions, disjunctions, and existential quanti ers (not necessarily in pre x position), are clearly preserved under this relation.
The pebble game ? 9 de ning the absolute version of this relation is just like that for A =p B except that it restricts Spoiler's choices to the universe of A. The coinductive notion thus de ned is that of a potential embedding of A into B, being a potential isomorphism with the \back" clause of the back-and-forth property clipped o . Since existential formulas are preserved along embeddings, they are also preserved under potential embeddings.
Lemma 2 The existential sentences have the Scott property with respect to the pebble game ? 9 .
Lyndon's Theorem
Very similar considerations apply to other standard preservation theorems, recast as interpolation under suitably generalized model relations. Many of these may be found by systematic variation on the inductive scheme for generating the formulas of L 1! from literals. We sample three. The formulas '(U + ) that involve a predicate U only positively play an important role in the theory of inductive and coinductive de nability, so one would like a semantic characterization of such formulas. As usual, this implies that '(U + ) is semantically monotone, i.e., preserved under increases in the extension of U. More generally, such a sentence will be preserved under U-homomorphism images. The notion f is a U-homomorphism from A onto B is de ned just as with isomorphism, except that with respect to U it need only be a homomorphism, that is, we require ha 1 ; : : : ; a n i 2 U A implies hf(a 1 ); : : : ; f(a n )i 2 U B , but not the converse.
There is an obvious pebble game ? U + : the partial functions are isomorphisms with respect to the symbols of L other than U, while for U, we require only at the one direction displayed above. 2. There exists a U-positive formula with ' j = and j = .
Proof: Given our general results, we need only verify that the U-positive formulas have the Scott Property with respect to the pebble game just de ned. The proof is just like the proof of Scott's Theorem except at stage 0 we do not allow any negated literals involving U. qed We could similarly prove a version for homomorphisms and positive formulas, of course, but turn instead to a di erent topic.
A modal preservation theorem
Modal logic is usually formulated as a propositional logic with additional operators. However, one can also treat it as a limited fragment of quanti cational logic, as stressed in van Benthem 10, 11] . Doing so facilitates the discovery of illuminating relationships between quanti cational logic and modal logic. x. This is written as 8y 2 x P 1 (y) ! P 1 (x) in L 1! , where the quanti cation is made explicit.
Thus, in this section, the vocabularies always consist of a set of unary relation symbols P j (where j ranges over some index set J) and a special designated binary symbol 2. Structures are of the form A = hA; E; P j i j2J . Here A is thought of as a set of sets or worlds, P j de nes the set of those sets containing the urelement p j or the worlds where the atomic sentence p j is true, and aEb can mean either that a is an element of b or that a is accessible from b. In this setting, a bisimulation is a one-pebble game between two models testing for the same atoms on related points, and allowing only back-and-forth choices for the two players that are 2-successors of the current positions. More formally, given A;B and I A B de ne ? (I) to be the set of those pairs ha; bi such that P j (a) i P j (b) (for all j 2 J), for every a 0 2 A a there is a b 0 2 B b such that ha 0 ; b 0 i 2 I, and vice versa. This is easily seen to be equivalent to the more usual de nition. Stated in this coinductive fashion, again, our previous analysis applies, including approximation via modal fragments up to quanti er rank (see Barwise and Moss 9] for details).
Theorem 15 The following are equivalent for all ' 2 1 1 (L 1! ) and 2 1 1 (L 1! ) both with one free variable x:
1. ' entails along bisimulation.
2. There exists some modal formula with ' j = and j = .
The following consequence of our result was obtained by di erent means in van Benthem 14] 3. There exists some modal formula with ' j = and j = .
Proof: The equivalence of (2) and (3) is a special case of the previous theorem. Clearly (2) If P is one of the unquanti ed predicates, and so de ned in both structures, we know that the structures agree about P along the bisimulation relation so that we can de ne: hw; vi 2 P C i w 2 P A i v 2 P B 1! has only partial isomorphisms up to size k, with back and forth conditions up to that size (see Barwise 6] for details). The partial isomorphisms are not required to be de ned on all constants of the vocabulary. Again, this ts all conditions of our analysis. The Scott property for this fragment was observed by Dawar 16] . Thus we obtain the following: Theorem 19 The following are equivalent for formulas ' 2 1 1 (L 1! ); 2 1 1 (L 1! ) with at total of at most k constants or free variables in their conjunction:
1. ' entails along potential isomorphisms of size k.
2. There exists some 2 L (k) 1! with ' j = and j = .
In particular, a sentence of L 1! is preserved under potential isomorphisms of size k i it is logically equivalent to a sentence of L (k) 1! . The preservation part of this is an extension of a semantic characterization for rst-order k-variable fragments given in van Benthem 12] .
Notice that the counterexample to standard interpolation for L 1! given above actually gives us sentences in ' 2 1 1 (L (2) 1! ) and 2 1 1 (L 4. for every t 0 2 S 0 with t = x t 0 there is a s 0 2 S such that s = x s 0 and s 0 It 0 . 4 We write I : (A; S) =p (B; S 0 ) to indicate that I is a potential isomorphism of generalized models. Notice the similarity of this notion to that of bisimulation, when one thinks of variable assignments as states. It is easy to show that if I : (A; S) =p (B; S 0 ) and sIs 0 then s and s 0 satisfy the same formulas in the respective generalized models.
For any ordinary L-structure A, we write fa(A) for the set of all nite assignments taking values in A, and write A for the generalized model (A; fa(A)). It is clear that truth and satisfaction in A and A agree.
Proof of Theorem 21: The direction from (2) to (1) (rng(f)):
Let F : B E ! B be de ned in the obvious way: F(hb; fi) = b on the rst kind of element and F(b) = b on the second kind of element. The interpretation of a predicate Q in B E copies its behavior in B so that F is a strong homomorphism from B E to B. Strong homomorphisms preserve truth of =-free sentences so B E j = ', as desired.
The set S of partial assignments consists of all nite assignments t such that each t(x) is a pair hb x ; f x i and the set ff x j x 2 dom(t)g is linearly ordered by inclusion; this insures that the f x are all subfunctions of a common partial embedding. To prove that A =p (B E ; S), de ne a relation I on fa(A) S as follows:
sIt i dom(s) = dom(t) and for all x in this domain, if t(x) = hb; fi then f(s(x)) = b.
We need to verify that I : A =p (B E ; S). So assume sIt. Clauses (1) and (2) are true by de nition of I. We need to verify the back and forth conditions. for L 1! presented here? Chang 15] shows there are analogues of the pebble game and Scott's Theorem for such languages, so that is promising. There is nothing analogous to the Boundedness Theorem for for such languages, however, since the class of well-orderings is de nable in these languages. Consequently the proof method of this paper breaks down at a seemingly crucial step.
